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1 Introduction
While the bulk of economic activity comes from publicly-owned ﬁrms, the
standard framework for a ﬁrm in industrial organization focuses on privately-
owned ﬁrms. Indeed, the real and ﬁnancial sectors are usually studied inde-
pendently. However, the real and ﬁnancial functions of the ﬁrm are strongly
linked, as the prices of ﬁnancial instruments are closely related to the prof-
its, and, thus, the prices of goods in the real sector. This paper studies the
inﬂuence of the ﬁnancial market on the decisions of ﬁrms in the real mar-
ket by considering the joint and simultaneous determination of real decisions
and equilibrium asset prices. To that end, we present a model in which the
shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the ﬁrms are
integrated through the price in the ﬁnancial market process. Financial ac-
cess alters the objective function of the ﬁrms, and the market interaction of
shareholders inﬂuences ﬁrms’ behavior in the real sector. In particular, the
ﬁnancial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the output
and ownership decisions of the ﬁrm. The participation from investors in the
ﬁnancial market also limits the ﬁrms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e.,
there is a loss of market power in the real sector.
Before presenting and discussing the results, we provide an overview of the
model. In order to obtain a clear exposition of the link between the real and
ﬁnancial sectors, we consider an economy with one ﬁrm and one investor. We
show in Appendix B that all our results hold in a model with several ﬁrms and
several shareholders. In our model, we consider a monopoly in the real sector
and perfect competition in the ﬁnancial sector.1 In the real market, the ﬁrm
supplies a good, generating random proﬁt. In addition, equity shares, which
are risky assets linked to the random real proﬁt, are sold in the ﬁnancial
1This market structure conveys the idea that any publicly-traded ﬁrm has, in general,
less ability to manipulate prices of ﬁnancial instruments than prices of real goods. Indeed,
while a ﬁrm can be a monopolist in the real sector due to barriers to entry, the ﬁnancial
market is by nature competitive. For instance, consider two ﬁrms, each selling a diﬀerent
product with little substitution or complementarity with the other product. While ﬁrms
face no competition in the real sector, their respective equity are in fact similar, i.e., each
is a claim to proﬁt. Hence, even if they are complementary due to portfolio diversiﬁcation,
there is more competition in the ﬁnancial market relative to the real market.
3
market. The decisions of the ﬁrm are inﬂuenced by the decisions of the
shareholders, whose objective is to maximize expected utility of ﬁnal wealth.
The group of shareholders is composed of one entrepreneur and one investor.
The entrepreneur is the founder of the ﬁrm and the original claimant of
the real proﬁts. The entrepreneur is also the managing shareholder of the
ﬁrm who undertakes a risky project in the real sector and interacts with
the investor in the ﬁnancial market in order to allocate risk, i.e., the random
proﬁt. While the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are allocated among the shareholders, the
entrepreneur retains control of the ﬁrm’s decisions. Speciﬁcally, subject to
real and ﬁnancial demands, the entrepreneur decides both the level of output
and the ownership structure of the ﬁrm. Yet the entrepreneur’s decisions are
inﬂuenced by the preferences of the investor through the price of the risky
asset. Indeed, the resulting market price of the risky asset is determined by
the optimal behavior of all the shareholders and is instrumental in inﬂuencing
the decisions of the ﬁrm.
The role of the ﬁnancial sector is two-fold. First, the decisions of the
ﬁrm (both the level of output and the ownership structure) reﬂect the pref-
erences of all the shareholders. The ﬁnancial price provides an incentive for
the managing shareholder (the entrepreneur) to act on behalf of all share-
holders. Second, the competitive ﬁnancial sector and the interaction of the
shareholders in the ﬁnancial market limit the ﬁrm’s ability to exercise market
power in the real sector. To see this, consider ﬁrst the benchmark situation in
which the ﬁrm has no access to the ﬁnancial sector (i.e., the ﬁrm is privately-
owned). Then, the ﬁrm receives revenues only from selling the real good
and the price of the real good depends on the quantity decision. Moreover,
because the ﬁrm is a monopoly in the real sector, the ﬁrm takes account of
the eﬀect of his quantity decision on the real price. In other words, the ﬁrm
exercises full market power. Suppose next that the monopoly has access to
the ﬁnancial sector (i.e., the ﬁrm is publicly-owned). With the introduction
of a ﬁnancial market, the objective of the ﬁrm is altered because it accounts
for ﬁnancial revenues from issuing equity shares. While, in equilibrium, the
ﬁnancial price depends on the real price through the expected payoﬀ of the
risky asset, the ﬁrm has no control over it. In other words, the ﬁrm does not
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take account of the eﬀect of its quantity decision on the real price through
the expected payoﬀ implicit in the ﬁnancial price. Hence, the market power
is partial, i.e., the ﬁrm controls the real price directly through the revenues
from the real sector, but not indirectly through the revenues from the ﬁnan-
cial sector. The reason is that the real price implicit in the ﬁnancial price
through the expected payoﬀ depends upon the beliefs of the investor about
the expected payoﬀs and not the actual choice of the ﬁrm. In equilibrium,
these beliefs coincide with the choice of the ﬁrm. Note that, while the loss of
market power changes expected proﬁts, it is not detrimental to shareholders
since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not
the mean) of proﬁts. Indeed, any change in expected proﬁts is absorbed by
the ﬁnancial price.
We then study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on the level of output and
the distribution of proﬁts. Access to the ﬁnancial market induces hybrid
behavior for a monopolist, that is, a convex combination of monopoly and
perfect competition, which results in a loss of market power in the real sec-
tor. This loss of market power implies that the monopolist behaves more
competitively, which yields a higher level of output, closer to that of the
competitive equilibrium in the real sector. Moreover, the allocation of risk
among shareholders reduces the cost of risk for the entrepreneur. Indeed, the
cost of bearing risk by a privately-owned monopolist is higher than the cost
of sharing risk among several shareholders in a publicly-owned monopolist.
The combination of the loss of market power with the spreading of risk im-
plies an increase in both output and risk-taking. In other words, ﬁnancial
access increases the variance of the real proﬁt of the ﬁrm.
Finally, ﬁnancial access alters the relationship between risk-aversion and
risk-taking (or the amount of risk undertaken by the ﬁrm). This is best seen
by studying the eﬀect of risk-aversion of the entrepreneur on the decisions
of the ﬁrm. Without a ﬁnancial sector, an increase in risk-aversion induces
the ﬁrm to decrease output, which decreases the amount of risk (i.e., the
variance of real proﬁt) undertaken. However, with ﬁnancial access, this eﬀect
is altered by the link between risk-aversion, ownership structure, and market
power. Speciﬁcally, a more risk-averse entrepreneur decreases the level of
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output, and, thus, decreases the variance of the real proﬁt. However, due
to the presence of the ﬁnancial sector, an increase in the entrepreneur’s risk
aversion induces a higher participation in the ﬁnancial sector (in order to
share risk), which further limits the exercise of market power, i.e., output
(and thus the variance of real proﬁt) increases due to a more competitive
behavior in the real sector. While these two eﬀects of risk-aversion (loss of
market power and reduction of risk) pull in opposite direction, the market
power eﬀect is stronger when the real demand is steeper than the ﬁnancial
demand. In that case, an increase in risk-aversion increases risk-taking.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, we study
the interplay between the ﬁrm and risk-averse shareholders. Previous work
has only studied the behavior of risk-averse ﬁrms maximizing the expected
utility of proﬁt. See Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) for the competitive
ﬁrm, and Baron (1971) for an imperfectly competitive market. Leland (1972)
provides a general treatment of a risk-averse ﬁrm facing demand uncertainty
under both perfect and imperfect competition. See also Hawawini (1978) for a
geometric exposition using the mean-variance framework.2 In this literature,
while ﬁrms take account of risk, i.e., decision-making is inﬂuenced by the
riskiness of proﬁts, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on the ﬁrms’ control over the
amount of risk through the market process is absent. Speciﬁcally, although
risk-averse shareholders have an aversion for risk, their rewards (expected
return) depend positively on the amount of risk the ﬁrm takes. In other
words, the higher the risk premium of an investor, the higher the premium
(in terms of expected returns) given to a shareholder to bear part of the
risk of the ﬁrm. This conﬂict between shareholders’ disdain for risk and
the increase in the payment when risk increases impacts real decisions. In
other words, merely assuming risk-aversion of the ﬁrm without studying the
underlying risk-taking process yields results in which the ﬁrm takes on less
risk, which necessarily reduces how much the investor is rewarded. In this
paper, we extend this literature by linking the behavior of the ﬁrms to the
portfolio selection of risk-averse shareholders. We show that risk-sharing
2The behavior of risk-averse ﬁrms facing uncertainty has also been extended to the
oligopolistic framework. See Asplund (2002) for a general treatment and references.
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among risk-averse shareholders induces the ﬁrms to take on more risk. We
also show that an explicit modeling of the interaction of shareholders does
not imply that the ﬁrm behaves simply as a risk-averse agent. In other words,
there is no equivalence between a risk-averse ﬁrm and a ﬁrm owned by risk-
averse shareholders. That is, the interaction of these shareholders and the
determination of the ﬁnancial price have a profound eﬀect on the behavior
of the ﬁrm.
Second, our work combines aspects of the industrial organization litera-
ture and the ﬁnancial literature. Real and ﬁnancial decisions have been inte-
grated in other contexts. The relationship between real and ﬁnancial sectors
have been studied in the context of the debt-equity positions of ﬁrms. See
Dotan and Ravid (1985), and Prezas (1988) for cases of a single ﬁrm, and
Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995) for studies in an oligopolistic
environment. Also, the relationship between real and ﬁnancial markets has
been studied in the context of insider trading. In particular, Jain and Mir-
man (2000) explicitly links real and ﬁnancial sectors through insider trading.
See also Leland (1992), Dow and Rahi (2003), and Medrano and Vives (2004)
for a welfare analysis of insider trading in the presence of real investment. In
our model, the entrepreneur makes no choice of debt-equity positions, and
has no informational motivations. Our interest lies in studying the nature of
the ﬁrm when the behavior of shareholders is explicitly integrated into the
model.
Finally, our work should be distinguished from a principal-agent model.3
Here, we are concerned with the inﬂuence of the shareholders interacting in
a ﬁnancial market, and not with the problem of incentives in the presence
of moral hazard and asymmetric information. In a principal-agent prob-
lem, the principal (the shareholder) hires an agent (a manager) to run his
ﬁrm. Because the shareholder is unable to perfectly monitor the manager,
conﬂicts of interests arise between the principal and the agent. Thus, the
shareholder oﬀers the manager a contract that provides the manager appro-
priate incentives to run the ﬁrm in the principal’s interests. Alternatively,
3See Wilson (1968), Ross (1973), Harris and Raviv (1978), Holmstro¨m (1979), Shavell
(1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), and Mirrlees (1999) for the principal-agent literature.
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Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Urosˇevic´ (2006) study the trade-oﬀ
between monitoring incentives and diversiﬁcation. A higher stake in a single
ﬁrm provides more incentive for monitoring but at the cost of higher risk ex-
posure. In our model, the deviation from maximizing expected proﬁt arises
from the explicit treatment of shareholders’ portfolio selection through the
market process and its relation to the ﬁrm’s decisions. In other words, we
study the market interaction of a group of risk-averse shareholders. This
interaction yields decisions on the type of risk to undertake, the ownership
structure of the ﬁrm to allocate that risk, and the characteristics of the risky
asset issued by the ﬁrm. Although it is the entrepreneur that makes the
decisions of the ﬁrm, the entrepreneur is provided with a market incentive
to perform on behalf of all shareholders, including himself, through the price
of the risky asset. The implementation of the optimal level of output by an
agent or the trade-oﬀ between monitoring incentives and diversiﬁcation are
not the purpose of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of
one ﬁrm and two shareholders. In Section 3, we deﬁne and characterize the
equilibrium. Several aspects of the optimal behavior of the monopolist with
shareholders are then presented. Section 4 discusses the role of the ﬁnancial
sector for the behavior of the ﬁrm. Section 5 studies the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
access on the optimal level of output. Section 6 analyses the inﬂuence of risk-
aversion on the amount of risk undertaken by the ﬁrm. Finally, Section 7
concludes and provides a discussion of possible extensions.
2 The Model
We present a model of a ﬁrm owned by shareholders. The ﬁrm supplies a
good in the real market, generating random proﬁt. In addition, equity shares,
which are risky assets linked to the random real proﬁt, are sold in the ﬁnancial
market. The market price of the risky asset reﬂects the optimal behavior of
the shareholders and integrates the preferences of all shareholders, which is
instrumental in inﬂuencing the decisions of the ﬁrm. We ﬁrst present the
model of the ﬁrm, and then describe the behavior of the shareholders.
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The analysis in the body of the paper focuses on a model with one ﬁrm
and two shareholders. The simpliﬁcation, abstracting from several ﬁrms and
many shareholders, yields a clear exposition of the structure of the model.
In Appendix B, we show that the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial sector on the real
sector, e.g., the inability of the ﬁrms to fully exercise market power in the
real sector, remain valid in a general model with several ﬁrms (and, thus,
several risky assets) and many shareholders (i.e., many entrepreneurs and
many investors). Moreover, risk remains relevant with a large number of
ﬁrms and shareholders, even in the limit.
2.1 The Firm
The ﬁrm is a monopoly in a real market with access to the ﬁnancial market.4
In the real market, the ﬁrm chooses the level of output q ≥ 0, facing a
random demand function. Speciﬁcally, the random price corresponding to
supplying q units is p˜R = PR(q) + ε˜, where PR(q) is the expected inverse
demand and ε˜ is a shock with zero mean.5 The presence of the shock is due
to both systematic and nonsystematic risk in the economy. The proﬁt of the
ﬁrm is thus π(q, ε˜) = (PR(q) + ε˜)q. The expected proﬁt is strictly concave in
the level of output.
Assumption 2.1. P ′′R(q)q + 2P
′
R(q) < 0.
In the ﬁnancial sector, the ﬁrm issues equity shares (a risky asset) at unit
price pF .
6 Each share is a claim on the proﬁt corresponding to one unit of
output. Hence, q shares of the risky asset are issued by the ﬁrm, and the
random payoﬀ of each share is p˜R.
7 Finally, the ﬁrm chooses the fraction
1 − ω ∈ [0, 1] of the shares sold in the ﬁnancial market. Hence, the variable
ω deﬁnes the ownership structure of the ﬁrm, which speciﬁes the allocation
of the random proﬁt among the shareholders.
4The adjective real refers to the sector of goods and services other than those of ﬁnancial
nature.
5The subscript R refers to the real sector and the tilde sign diﬀerentiates a random
variable from its realization.
6The subscript F refers to the financial sector.
7The fact that there are q shares when q units of output are sold is a normalization.
Shares are assumed to be inﬁnitely divisible entities.
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2.2 The Shareholders
The objective of each shareholder is to maximize the expected utility of ﬁnal
wealth. To that end, each shareholder diversiﬁes wealth between the risky
asset issued by the ﬁrm and a risk-free asset with a rate of return normalized
to one. This interaction of the shareholders in the ﬁnancial market deter-
mines both the amount and the share of risk taken on the ﬁrm, and, therefore
it determines the real output of the ﬁrm.
In our model, there are two shareholders: an entrepreneur and an in-
vestor.8 The entrepreneur is the founder of the ﬁrm and the original claimant
of the proﬁt generated by his entrepreneurial prospects. The entrepreneur
is also the managing shareholder of the ﬁrm, making the output decision,
retaining part of the risky asset, and selling the remaining shares to the in-
vestor. The proceeds from the sale of shares is invested at a risk-free rate.
Unlike the entrepreneur, the investor does not have entrepreneurial prospects
and has no direct control over the decisions of the ﬁrm. However, the investor
has initial wealth WI > 0, which is used to purchase shares of the risky asset
and the risk-free asset.
We now derive the ﬁnal wealth of the entrepreneur and the investor. The
entrepreneur’s random ﬁnal wealth combines the payoﬀs from both the real
and ﬁnancial sectors, as well as an unsharable cost of eﬀort:
W˜ ′E = ωp˜Rq + (1− ω)pF q − cq2/2, (1)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is the entrepreneur’s level of ownership. The expression
ωp˜Rq is the entrepreneur’s portion of the random proﬁt of the ﬁrm, while
(1 − ω)pF q is the wealth generated from selling claims to the proﬁt of the
remaining (1− ω)q units of output at price pF , and investing (1− ω)pF q in
a risk-free asset. Here, the rate of return of the risk free asset is normalized
to one. Finally, the term cq2/2, c > 0 is the total cost of eﬀort necessary to
undertake production in the real sector. The cost of eﬀort, unlike the proﬁt,
cannot be shared with the investor, and is borne entirely by the entrepreneur.
8See Appendix B for the model with several ﬁrms and many shareholders.
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The ﬁnal wealth of the investor is derived by diversifying the initial wealth
WI between m shares of the risk-free asset and z shares of the risky asset
issued by the ﬁrm. Given the budget constraint of the investor, WI = m +
pF z, his random ﬁnal wealth is
W˜ ′I = WI + (p˜R − pF )z. (2)
Here, WI −pF z is invested in the risk-free asset and p˜Rz is the random payoﬀ
corresponding to z shares of the risky asset. Note that the return on a share
of the ﬁrm is p˜R − pF .
Next, we present the objective functions of the shareholders. Each share-
holder maximizes the expected utility of ﬁnal wealth deﬁned by (1) or (2).
The shareholders are assumed to be risk-averse in ﬁnal wealth, which yields
portfolio diversiﬁcation. For tractability, we assume that the systematic
shock is normally distributed and the shareholders’ preferences for ﬁnal
wealth exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Assumption 2.2. ε˜ ∼ N(0, σ2).
Assumption 2.3. The coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion are aE > 0 and
aI > 0 for the entrepreneur and the investor, respectively.
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Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 combined with the general structure of the real
sector yields a closed-form characterization of the shareholders’ maximization
problems. It also yields a strictly monotonic relation between expected utility
and a certainty equivalent. Hence, maximizing expected utility of ﬁnal wealth
is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent
approach is valid and is used throughout the paper.
From (1), given that p˜R = PR(q) + ε˜, the certainty equivalent of the
entrepreneur is10
CEE = ωPR(q)q + (1− ω)pF q − aEσ2ω2q2/2− cq2/2. (3)
9In other words, utility functions for ﬁnal wealth x are exponential: u(x; a) =
−e−ax, a ∈ {aE, aI}.
10The expected utility of the entrepreneur is Eu(W˜E ; aE) = e
−aECEE , where E is the
expectation operator.
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Here, ωPR(q)q+(1−ω)pF q−cq2/2 is the expected payoﬀ to the entrepreneur
from the real and ﬁnancial sectors weighted by the level of ownership and
net of the cost of eﬀort. The term aEσ
2ω2q2/2 is the risk premium of the
entrepreneur. The risk premium plays the role of a cost, due to risk aversion,
imposed on the entrepreneur for bearing part of the risk. From (2), the
certainty equivalent of the investor is
CEI = WI + (PR(q)− pF )z − aIσ2z2/2. (4)
Here, WI + (PR(q)− pF )z is the expected mean of ﬁnal wealth and aIσ2z2/2
is the risk premium.
The real and ﬁnancial sectors are integrated because the payoﬀ of the
risky asset depends on the level of output, and reﬂects the uncertainty of the
real sector. Also, the level of output depends on the amount of risk assumed
by the investor. This link between the decisions of the ﬁrm and the behavior
of the shareholders is shown in (3). Note that the decisions of the ﬁrm are
derived directly from the behavior of the entrepreneur, but the inﬂuence of
the investor on the ﬁrm’s decisions is indirect and comes through pF , the
price of the risky asset. Indeed, the investor’s optimal behavior inﬂuences
the ﬁnancial price, which, in turn, has an eﬀect on the behavior of the ﬁrm
via the entrepreneur’s maximization problem.
3 The Equilibrium
Having described the model, we now deﬁne and characterize the equilibrium.
The entrepreneur and the investor move simultaneously in a Nash equilib-
rium. The ﬁnancial sector is perfectly competitive, i.e., the ﬁnancial price
is given, and, thus, neither the entrepreneur nor the investor can take into
account the eﬀect of their decisions on the ﬁnancial price. In equilibrium, the
price of the risky asset clears the ﬁnancial market by equating the quantity
demanded by the investor with the quantity supplied by the ﬁrm (or the
entrepreneur). The equilibrium consists of the ﬁrms’ decisions made by the
entrepreneur {q∗, ω∗}, the investor’s amount of shares of the risky asset z∗,
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and the ﬁnancial price p∗F .
Deﬁnition 3.1. The tuple {q∗, ω∗, z∗, p∗F} is an equilibrium if
1. Given q∗ and p∗F , the investor’s quantity demanded for the risky asset
is
z∗ = argmax
z≥0
{
WI + (PR(q
∗)− p∗F )z − aIσ2z2/2
}
. (5)
2. Given p∗F ,
{q∗, ω∗} = arg max
q≥0,ω∈[0,1]
{
ωPR(q)q + (1− ω)p∗F q − aEσ2ω2q2/2− cq2/2
}
.
(6)
3. Given q∗, ω∗, and z∗, p∗F satisﬁes the market-clearing condition z
∗ =
(1− ω∗)q∗.
Before proceeding with the characterization of the equilibrium, we com-
ment on an important aspect of the equilibrium. In the investor’s maxi-
mization problem, a conjecture about the expected payoﬀ of the share of
the risky asset is formed, i.e., PR(q
c) where c stands for conjecture. Since
the conjecture is consistent with the behavior of the ﬁrm in equilibrium,
PR(q
c) = PR(q
∗) as written in (5). The investor forms a conjecture because
the decisions and payoﬀs of the entrepreneur (or the ﬁrm) are unobservable
by the investor at the time of decision-making. In other words, the investor
purchases stocks of the ﬁrm based on his beliefs about payoﬀs that are yet
to be realized. The beliefs of the investor inﬂuence the behavior of the ﬁrm,
but are not under the control of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 3.2 states that there exists a unique equilibrium as long as
the cost of eﬀort is high enough to make the entrepreneur’s objective func-
tion strictly concave. The more restrictive condition is needed due to the
interaction of the shareholders in the perfectly competitive ﬁnancial market,
but has no bearing on our results except for ensuring the existence of an
equilibrium. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that caEσ
2 > ωP ′′R(q)qaEσ
2+P ′R(q)P
′
R(q). Then,
there exists a unique equilibrium.
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Next, we characterize and discuss the equilibrium. We begin with the
behavior of the investor. Proposition 3.3 provides the investor’s quantity
demanded of shares for the risky asset.
Proposition 3.3. In equilibrium, the investor’s quantity demanded for the
risky asset is
z∗ =
PR(q
∗)− p∗F
aIσ2
, (7)
where PR(q
∗)− p∗F is the expected return of a share of the risky asset.
The investor’s amount of shares depends positively on the expected payoﬀ
PR(q
∗), and negatively on both the risk-aversion of the investor, and the
variance of the real shock (i.e., the riskiness of the project). Using (7),
Proposition 3.4 states the equilibrium ﬁnancial price that clears the ﬁnancial
market, i.e., z∗ = (1− ω∗)q∗.
Proposition 3.4. In equilibrium, the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR(q
∗)− aIσ2(1− ω∗)q∗. (8)
The price of a share of the risky asset is equal to the expected price of
the real good minus the term aIσ
2(1− ω∗)q∗, which is closely related to the
investor’s risk premium. Here, the entrepreneur sells shares of the risky asset
at a price below the expected payoﬀ in order to induce the investor to bear
some of the risk. For each share sold, the risk-averse entrepreneur incurs a
cost for reducing his own risk.
The price of the risky asset is at the core of the market allocation of risk
between the entrepreneur and the investor. The ﬁnancial market brings to-
gether the agents’ diverse interests for the risky asset and determines the risk
faced by each agent. The ﬁnancial price depends not only on the investor’s
behavior, but also on the entrepreneur’s decisions. For instance, the lower
the entrepreneur’s level of ownership, the lower the price of the risky asset.
Finally, the price of the risky asset establishes the link between the real
and ﬁnancial sectors. Here, the reservation price of the risky asset is the
expected real price. Any change in the real market that increases the demand
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for the real good translates into a higher price of the risky asset through a
higher reservation price.
Having characterized the ﬁnancial price, we next turn to the optimal
behavior of the entrepreneur. Proposition 3.5 characterizes the equilibrium
decisions of the ﬁrm made by the entrepreneur corresponding to (6). Recall
that the entrepreneur takes the ﬁnancial price as given. In particular, he has
no inﬂuence on the reservation price of the risky asset because it refers to the
beliefs of the investor about the expected payoﬀ of the risky asset. However,
in equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ of the risky asset does depend on the
entrepreneur’s choice of output, i.e., PR(q
∗) is function of the equilibrium
level of output.
Proposition 3.5. In equilibrium, output q∗ satisﬁes
ω∗ (P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗))+(1−ω∗)PR(q∗) = ω∗2aEσ2q∗+(1−ω∗)2aIσ2q∗+ cq∗
(9)
and
ω∗ =
aI
aI + aE
. (10)
Two comments regarding Proposition 3.5 are warranted. First, consider
expression (9).11 The left-hand side is the generalized marginal revenue of
output. It admits all the possibilities of ﬁnancial participation, including the
limiting case of no ﬁnancial participation, i.e., ω∗ = 1.12, i.e., a ﬁrm that is
owned and managed by a single agent. The right-hand side is the sum of the
marginal cost of sharing risk and the marginal cost of eﬀort. The ﬁrst term of
the right-hand side is related to the entrepreneur’s risk aversion and reﬂects
the cost of bearing risk corresponding to a fraction ω∗ of additional output.
The second term depends on the investor’s risk aversion and characterizes
the entrepreneur’s cost of reducing risk corresponding to a fraction 1−ω∗ of
additional output. The cost of reducing risk is related to the payment to the
investor for bearing some of the additional risk.
11If PR(q) = θ−γq, θ, γ > 0, then, from (9) and (10), q∗ = θ/
(
(1 + ω∗)γ + ω∗aEσ2 + c
)
.
12From (10), ω∗ = 1 when the entrepreneur is risk-neutral or, alternatively, aI → ∞,
which is equivalent to the the case in which there is no investor in the market, as he cannot
bear any risk.
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Next, consider expression (10). Note that the equilibrium ownership
structure is independent of the real sector. Indeed, using (6), the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to ω is PR(q)q − p∗F q = aEσ2ωq2 evaluated at q = q∗
and ω = ω∗. Using (8), the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ω is rewritten
as
aIσ
2(1− ω)q2 = aEσ2ωq2, (11)
evaluated at q = q∗ and ω = ω∗. From (11), the real price plays no role
in determining ω∗. To understand why, observe that the expected return
of a share is independent of the real demand, i.e., from (8), PR(q
∗) − p∗F =
aIσ
2(1−ω∗)q∗.13 In other words, the expected proﬁt corresponding to a share
(i.e., the real mean price) has no eﬀect on the expected return. This is due to
the fact that any changes in the expected proﬁt is absorbed by the ﬁnancial
price, and, thus, the diﬀerence between expected payoﬀ and ﬁnancial price
is independent of expected proﬁt.
In addition, ω∗ is independent of σ2. Indeed, an increase in σ2 increases
the entrepreneur’s payment to the investor, which induces the entrepreneur
to retain more ownership. At the same time, a riskier real proﬁt increases
the entrepreneur’s cost of bearing risk, inducing less ownership on the part of
the entrepreneur. In equilibrium, these two eﬀects pull in opposite directions
in equal strength, and, thus, cancel each other. Similarly, from (11), ω∗ is
independent of the entrepreneur’s output choice. Therefore, the equilibrium
allocation of equity among the entrepreneur and the investor is independent
of the real proﬁt of the ﬁrm.
In the next three sections, several aspects of the behavior of the monopo-
list with shareholders are presented. First, the role of the ﬁnancial sector for
the behavior of the ﬁrm is discussed. Second, we study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
access on the optimal level of output. Finally, the inﬂuence of risk-aversion
on the amount of risk undertaken by the ﬁrm is analyzed.14
13More precisely, the expected return of a share does not depend directly on the real
demand, although it does depend on it indirectly through the policy functions.
14The amount of risk is measured by the variance of the real proﬁt, VπR(q, ε˜) = σ
2q2,
where V is the variance operator.
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4 The Role of the Financial Sector
In this section, we show that the ﬁnancial sector inﬂuences the behavior
of the ﬁrm in two ways. First, the interaction of shareholders limits the
ﬁrm’s ability to exercise market power in the real sector. Second, the price
of the stock determined in the ﬁnancial sector integrates the preferences of
all the shareholders for both the choice of output and the allocation of the
risk among the shareholders (ownership structure). Both inﬂuences of the
ﬁnancial market on the entrepreneur go through the price of the risky asset,
which appears in the payoﬀ function of the entrepreneur.
4.1 Market Power
The extent to which the ﬁrm is able to exercise market power in the real
sector is captured by the left-hand side of (9). If the ﬁrm is completely owned
by the entrepreneur, the real demand is the sole basis for the maximization
proﬁt, i.e., the marginal revenue from the real sector determines the output
of the ﬁrm. However, given the optimal ownership structure ω∗ ∈ [0, 1], the
ﬁrm can only manipulate a fraction ω∗ of the real demand. The remaining
fraction 1 − ω∗ cannot be manipulated by the entrepreneur since, although
the real demand is implicit in the ﬁnancial price, it corresponds to the beliefs
of the investor and not the actual choice of the entrepreneur about expected
payoﬀs. The more ownership relinquished by the entrepreneur, the weaker
the degree of market power exercised by the ﬁrm. By selling more shares, the
entrepreneur forgoes market power in the real sector in exchange for revenue
as well as a reduction in risk. Financial access reduces a monopolist’s ability
to exercise market power in the real sector because the perfectly competitive
nature of the ﬁnancial sector ﬂows over to the real sector.
As an illustration, the ability to manipulate the real price can be thought
of as the ability to charge a markup above the marginal cost. If the demand
belongs to a class of demands that can be ordered by their elasticity of
demand, e.g., PR(q) = q
− 1
η , where η > 1 is the elasticity, then (9) is rewritten
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as
PR(q
∗)−MC(q∗, ω∗)
PR(q∗)
=
ω∗
Ed
, (12)
which relates the Learner index to the ownership level of the managing share-
holder and the elasticity of demand. Here, MC(q∗, ω∗) refers to the right-
hand side of (9), ω∗ = aI/(aI + aE), and Ed = η is the elasticity of demand.
For any given level of elasticity, a higher level of ﬁnancial integration (a lower
ω∗) reduces the ﬁrm’s ability to charge a markup, which illustrates our result.
In other words, under ﬁnancial access, the markup depends not only on the
real demand, but also on the intensity of ﬁnancial participation.
4.2 Shareholders’ Preferences
The ﬁnancial sector integrates the preferences of all the shareholders into
the decisions of the ﬁrm. Regarding the choice of output, the marginal cost
of risk sharing (the ﬁrst two terms of the right-hand side of (9)) combines
the diﬀerent preferences of the shareholders (both the entrepreneur and the
investor). In particular, the ﬁrm takes account of the investor’s preferences
through the cost of reducing risk, which reﬂects the investor’s willingness to
bear part of the ﬁrm’s risk. The more ownership acquired by the investor,
the more weight is given to the investor’s preferences.
As for the ownership structure deﬁned by (10), the preferences of the
shareholders are at the core of the allocation of risk among the shareholders.
Indeed, a more risk-averse entrepreneur increases the cost of bearing risk,
which induces a reduction of his exposure to risk, ∂ω∗/∂aE < 0.15 A more
risk-averse investor increases the cost of reducing risk, which reduces the
entrepreneur’s incentive to relinquish ownership of the ﬁrm, ∂ω∗/∂aI > 0.
5 The Eﬀect of Financial Access
Having described the role of the ﬁnancial price on the behavior of the ﬁrm,
we now turn to the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on the optimal behavior of
15From (11), the cost of reducing risk depends on the expected return of a share of the
risky asset held by an investor.
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the ﬁrm. To that end, we introduce two benchmark models of no ﬁnancial
access. The ﬁrst characterizes the optimal behavior of a monopolist facing no
risk. The second concerns the optimal behavior of a monopolist facing risk.
Comparing the two benchmark models allows us to study the eﬀect of risk on
the optimal output of the ﬁrm. Comparing our model with the benchmark
models allows us to study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on the optimal output.
Since the distribution of real proﬁt is directly tied to the level of output, i.e.,
πR(q, ε˜) ∼ N(PR(q)q, σ2q2), we are also able to study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
access on the amount of risk undertaken by the ﬁrm.
5.1 Benchmark Models of No Financial Access
We ﬁrst present the two benchmark models, and, then, study the eﬀect of risk
on the optimal output.16 No ﬁnancial access implies that the entrepreneur
retains ownership of the ﬁrm, i.e., ω = 1.
No Risk. If there is no risk, i.e., σ2 = 0, the entrepreneur maximizes
expected proﬁt, so that (6) evaluated at ω = 1 and σ2 = 0 is maxq≥0 PR(q)q−
cq2/2. Optimal output, q′, satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
P ′R(q
′)q′ + PR(q′) = cq′. (13)
Condition (13) is also valid for a risk-neutral ﬁrm facing risk, i.e., aE = 0
and σ2 > 0.
Risk. Under risk and risk-aversion, but no ﬁnancial access, i.e., aE , σ
2 >
0 and ω = 1, (6) is rewritten as maxq≥0 PR(q)q−aEσ2q2/2−cq2/2. The second
term of the objective function is the risk premium of the entrepreneur. The
risk premium plays the role of a cost, due to risk aversion, imposed on the
entrepreneur for bearing risk. Optimal output, qˆ, satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition
P ′R(qˆ)qˆ + PR(qˆ) = aEσ
2qˆ + cqˆ. (14)
The Eﬀect of Risk under Risk-Aversion. From (13) and (14), the
presence of risk induces a risk-averse ﬁrm to decrease output, as shown in
16See Leland (1972) for an in-depth analysis of a risk-averse ﬁrm facing risk.
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Figure 1a: No Risk
q
PR
Figure 1b: Risk
Demand
Marginal Cost
of Bearing Risk
qˆ q′q′
M R(q)M R(q)
Figure 1: The Eﬀect of Risk on a Risk-Averse Monopolist
Figure 1. To simplify the ﬁgures, we abstract from the cost of eﬀort by
setting c = 0.17
Figure 1a depicts the case of a monopolist facing no risk. The optimal
output q′ sets the marginal revenue equal to zero, as in (13) evaluated at
c = 0. Figure 1b depicts the case of a monopolist facing risk. Because the
entrepreneur is risk-averse, the optimal output qˆ sets the marginal revenue
equal to the marginal cost of bearing risk, the right-hand side of (14) evalu-
ated at c = 0. This has the eﬀect of reducing output (qˆ < q′ in Figure 1b),
and, thus, the amount of risk undertaken by the ﬁrm (the variance of the
real proﬁt) is reduced.
5.2 Financial Access
We next study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on optimal output by comparing
a monopolist facing risk with and without ﬁnancial access. Formally,
Proposition 5.1. From (9), (10), and (14), ﬁnancial access increases out-
put.
17Recall that c > 0 is necessary to ensure the existence of the equilibrium. However, the
value of c plays no role on the analysis other than ensuring the existence of the equilibrium.
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Figure2a: No Financial Access
q
PR
Figure2b: Financial Access
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Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Financial Access on a Risk-Averse Monopolist
The eﬀect of ﬁnancial access is shown in Figure 2 with c = 0. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 2a (identical to Figure 1b) depicts the optimal behavior of a risk-
averse monopolist without ﬁnancial access supplying qˆ, where the marginal
revenue is equal to the marginal cost of bearing risk. In Figure 2b, a ﬁrm
with ﬁnancial access (owned by several shareholders) supplies q∗, where the
generalized marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of sharing risk, as
in (9) evaluated at c = 0. Consistent with Proposition 5.1, qˆ < q∗. It follows
immediately that ﬁnancial access increases both the mean and variance of
the real proﬁt.
While risk decreases output for a risk-averse ﬁrm, the allocation of risk
(via the ﬁnancial market) reverses the eﬀect, i.e., increases output. The eﬀect
of ﬁnancial access on output is two-fold. First, the monopolist behaves more
competitively in the real sector. In particular, the investor’s conjecture about
the payoﬀs of the risky asset induces more perfectly competitive behavior in
the real sector. This implies a higher level of output. Second, the interaction
of the shareholders in order to share the risk of the ﬁrm reduces the cost of
risk, which also implies a higher level of output.
Both eﬀects are restated formally in Remarks 5.2 and 5.3. Proposition 5.1
follows immediately from Remarks 5.2 and 5.3.
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Remark 5.2. Access to a ﬁnancial market induces hybrid behavior for a mo-
nopolist, that is, a convex combination of monopoly and perfect competition
in the real sector.18
The inﬂuence of the ﬁnancial market induces the ﬁrm to increase output,
because the generalized marginal revenue, the left-hand side of (9), lies above
the marginal revenue in Figure 2b.
The reduction in the cost of risk is shown in Figure 2b, where, for any
level of output, the marginal cost of bearing risk lies above the marginal cost
of sharing risk. This decrease in cost also induces the ﬁrm to supply more.
Remark 5.3. Financial access lowers the cost of risk.
To understand Remark 5.3, simplify expression (9):19
ω∗ (P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)) + (1− ω∗)PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗ + cq∗. (15)
From (10), ω∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the cost of bearing risk with no ﬁnancial access
is always greater than the cost of sharing risk with the investor. Speciﬁcally,
for any level of output, the right-hand side of (14) is greater than the right-
hand side of (15).20
One implication of Proposition 5.1 is that an increase in output due to
ﬁnancial access is beneﬁcial to the investor because the expected return
(PR(q
∗)− p∗F ) z∗ = aIσ2 (1− ω∗)2 q∗2 (16)
increases with more ﬁnancial access. This is due to the fact that the expected
18Formally, with no ﬁnancial access, optimal output of a monopolist satisﬁes (14), while
optimal output of a perfectly competitive ﬁrm satisﬁes PR(q) = aEσ
2q + cq. Hence, the
left-hand side of (9) combines both monopoly and perfectly competitive behavior.
19Plugging (10) into (9) and rearranging yields (15). In other words, given (10),
ω∗2aEσ2q∗ + (1− ω∗)2aIσ2q∗ = ω∗aEσ2q∗.
20Remark 5.3 is true because the value of ω∗ makes it possible to rewrite (9) as (15).
In other words, endogenizing the ownership structure lowers the cost of risk, and, thus,
makes the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access unambiguous. If ω was a parameter instead of a control
variable, then Remark 5.3 would not hold. Speciﬁcally, if ω = ω¯ ∈ [0, 1] was ﬁxed, then,
for any level of output, the marginal cost of sharing risk under an exogenous ownership
structure, i.e., ω¯2aEσ
2q + (1− ω¯)2aIσ2q and the marginal cost of bearing risk (the right-
hand side of (14)) cannot be ordered.
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Figure 3: The Strength of Financial Access on a Risk-Averse Monopolist
return of a share to the investor is unrelated to the expected proﬁts of the
ﬁrm. Rather, the expected return depends on the variance (risk) of real
proﬁts. In other words, the investor is rewarded for the amount of risk
borne. Consequently, the loss of market power discussed in Section 4.1 does
not imply a loss for the investor. Any changes in the expected proﬁt is
absorbed by the ﬁnancial price, i.e., ∂p∗F/∂PR(q
∗) = 1. Hence, the diﬀerence
between expected payoﬀ and ﬁnancial price is independent of expected proﬁt.
Having established that ﬁnancial access increases the output of a risk-
averse monopolist, we next study the strength of this eﬀect. The extent to
which behavior is altered by access to the ﬁnancial market depends on the
intensity of ﬁnancial participation, i.e., the portion of the ﬁrm sold to the
investor. Indeed, a lower ω∗ yields more ﬁnancial participation, which, in
turn, intensiﬁes the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access by inducing the monopolist to
behave more like a perfectly competitive ﬁrm in the real sector, as well as by
lowering the cost of sharing risk.
The strength of ﬁnancial access can be signiﬁcant as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3 evaluated at c = 0. Indeed, depending on the ownership structure,
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ﬁnancial access tempers or even reverses the eﬀect of risk on output.21 To
see this, compare output q′ under no risk and output q∗ under ﬁnancial ac-
cess. On the one hand, strong ﬁnancial participation (low ω∗) reverses the
eﬀect of risk on optimal output, i.e., q∗ > q′ in Figure 3a. On the other hand,
weak ﬁnancial participation (high ω∗) tempers the eﬀect of risk, i.e., q∗ < q′
in Figure 3b. It follows that, depending on the strength of ﬁnancial access,
expected proﬁt PR(q)q might increase or decrease. Speciﬁcally, weak ﬁnan-
cial participation unambiguously increases expected proﬁt. Strong ﬁnancial
participation might decrease expected proﬁt as optimal output is much closer
to the one chosen by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm.
6 Risk-Aversion and Risk-Taking
In this section, we show that access to the ﬁnancial sector alters the ef-
fect of risk-aversion on risk-taking (or the amount of risk undertaken by the
ﬁrm), i.e., the eﬀects of aE and aI on VπR(q
∗, ε˜) = σ2q∗2. Speciﬁcally, with
no ﬁnancial sector, an increase in risk-aversion induces the ﬁrm to decrease
output, which decreases the amount of risk undertaken.22 However, with
ﬁnancial access, the eﬀect is altered by the link between risk-aversion, own-
ership structure, and market power. Proposition 6.1 summarizes the eﬀects
of aE and aI on the variance of real proﬁt under ﬁnancial access. In particu-
lar, the direction of the eﬀect of aE on VπR(q
∗, ε˜) depends on the diﬀerence
between the slopes of the real and ﬁnancial demands.23
Proposition 6.1. In equilibrium,
1. ∂VπR(q
∗,ε˜)
∂aE
> 0 if and only if −P ′R(q∗) > aIσ2.
2. VπR(q
∗,ε˜)
∂aI
< 0.
21Recall that risk decreases output (qˆ < q′ in Figure 1), while, from Proposition 5.1,
ﬁnancial access increases output (qˆ < q∗ in Figure 2).
22From (14), an increase in aE increases the cost of bearing risk, which induces the
ﬁrm to reduce output, and, thus, the amount of risk undertaken. In other words, being
more-risk averse induces the ﬁrm to reduce the variance of the real proﬁt.
23From (8), −aIσ2 is the slope of the demand for shares of the risky asset.
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Proof. Recall (15):
ω∗ (P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)) + (1− ω∗)PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗ + cq, (17)
where, from (10), ω∗ = aI/(aI + aE). Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to aE
and aI yields ∂q
∗/∂aE > 0 if and only if −P ′R(q∗) > aIσ2, and ∂q∗/∂aI < 0.
Since VπR(q
∗, ε˜) = σ2q∗2, Proposition 6.1 follows.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of aE on VπR(q
∗, ε˜). Note that an increase in
aE induces the entrepreneur to sell a larger fraction of the ﬁrm, i.e., ω
∗
decreases. This, in turn, has an eﬀect not only on the cost of risk, but also
on the ﬁrm’s ability to exercise market power. Speciﬁcally, from the left-hand
side of (17), an increase in aE reduces the monopolist’s ability to manipulate
the price. This implies a higher level of output and thus a higher level of
risk-taking. From the right-hand side, an increase in aE increases the cost
of risk, which induces the ﬁrm to decrease the level of output, and, thus, to
decrease the amount of risk undertaken.24 Hence, the two eﬀects of aE on q
∗
(and VπR(q
∗, ε˜)) pull in opposite directions. The overall eﬀect depends on
the slopes of the real and ﬁnancial demand curves. For instance, when the
real demand is steeper than the ﬁnancial demand, the eﬀect of aE is stronger
on the exercise of market power than on the cost of risk. Hence, a more
risk-averse entrepreneur increases the amount of risk undertaken.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of aI on VπR(q
∗, ε˜). Proposition 6.1 states that
an increase in aI leads to a decrease in the amount of risk undertaken by the
ﬁrm. Since a more risk-averse investor limits the entrepreneur’s participation
in the ﬁnancial sector, ω∗ increases. This, in turn, has an eﬀect not only
on the cost of risk, but also on the ﬁrm’s ability to exercise market power.
Indeed, from the left-hand side of (17), an increase in aI reduces the inﬂuence
of the perfectly competitive ﬁnancial market, which implies a decrease in
output. From the right-hand side, an increase in aI increases the cost of
24Note that the eﬀect of aE on the right-hand side of (17) is two-fold. First, as aE
increases, the right-hand side increases directly. Second, an increase in aE increases the
cost of risk, which gives the entrepreneur an incentive to relinquish a higher fraction of
the ﬁrm, i.e., ω∗ decreases. The overall eﬀect of aE on the cost of risk via the ﬁnancial
market is nonetheless always positive.
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risk, which implies a decrease in output as well. Hence, the amount of risk
undertaken by the ﬁrm decreases.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper, ﬁnancial access is shown to reduce a monopolist’s ability to
exercise market power in the real sector. Indeed, if a monopolist is privately
owned, it fully exercises market power. Once a monopolist goes public, the
interaction of the shareholders in a perfectly competitive ﬁnancial market
limits the ﬁrm’s ability to manipulate the real price. Moreover, the ability to
exercise market power in the real sector is reduced as ﬁnancial participation
increases. Consequently, more ﬁnancial participation reduces welfare loss in
the real sector as the monopolist behaves more like a perfectly competitive
ﬁrm. While not discussed in the paper, this result has implications regarding
the extent to which public policy is used to avoid the negative consequences
of market power.
In order to study the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial sector and the market inter-
action of the shareholders on the behavior of the ﬁrm, we have abstracted
from two important aspects. First, there is no asymmetric information in
our model. In fact, asymmetric information is ubiquitous among sharehold-
ers. For instance, consider a situation in which some investors do not know
the true distribution of the risky asset’s payoﬀ. Learning occurs because the
price of the risky asset is used as a signal by uninformed investors to infer
the unknown distribution. Second, in our model, the motivation for the in-
teraction of shareholders is solely risk sharing. Extending the model to a
dynamic setting in which ﬁrms can raise money in order to buy capital adds
another layer of complexity.
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A Proof
Using Deﬁnition 3.1, we characterize the equilibrium. Given q∗ and p∗F , the
ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (5) is PR(q
∗)−p∗F = aIσ2z, so that the
quantity demanded for the risky asset is
z∗ =
PR(q
∗)− p∗F
aIσ2
, (18)
as in (7). The second-order condition is satisﬁed. Given p∗F , the ﬁrst-order
conditions corresponding to (6) are
q : ω (P ′R(q)q + PR(q)) + (1− ω)p∗F = aEσ2ω2q + cq, (19)
ω : PR(q)q − p∗F q = aEσ2ωq2. (20)
Given q∗ and ω∗ and the market-clearing condition, the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR(q
∗)− aIσ2(1− ω∗)q∗, (21)
as in (8). Using (21), (19) simpliﬁes to (9) evaluated at q = q∗ and ω = ω∗
and solving (20) yields (10). The Hessian corresponding to (6) is
H =
[
ω (P ′′R(q)q + 2P
′
R(q))− aEσ2ω2 − c P ′R(q)q + PR(q)− p∗F − 2aEσ2ωq
P ′R(q)q + PR(q)− p∗F − 2aEσ2ωq −aEσ2q2
]
(22)
evaluated at q = q∗. From (20), PR(q)q − p∗F q = aEσ2ωq2 and q > 0, so that
PR(q)− p∗F = aEσ2ωq so that the Hessian matrix can be rewritten as
H =
[
ω (P ′′R(q)q + 2P
′
R(q))− aEσ2ω2 − c P ′R(q)q − aEσ2ωq
P ′R(q)q − aEσ2ωq −aEσ2q2
]
(23)
evaluated at q = q∗. Since caEσ2 > ωP ′′R(q)qaEσ
2 + P ′R(q)P
′
R(q) from Propo-
sition 3.2, the Hessian matrix is negative deﬁnite.
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B Extension
In this appendix, we extend the model to several ﬁrms and many sharehold-
ers. We ﬁrst show that all our results hold. In particular, the interaction
of shareholders leads to a loss of market power in the real sector and the
ﬁnancial market integrates the shareholders’ preferences into the decisions
of the ﬁrms. We also show that risk and uncertainty are still relevant with
a larger number of agents, even in the limit. See Fesselmeyer et al. (2012)
for a general discussion of risk sharing in large economies. We ﬁrst describe
the model and deﬁne the equilibrium. We then characterize and discuss the
equilibrium.
B.1 Model and Equilibrium
The Firms. Consider an economy with NE ≥ 1 ﬁrms. Firm j is a monop-
olist in the real market and has access to a competitive ﬁnancial market. In
other words, each ﬁrm is a local monopoly in the real sector facing global
competition in the ﬁnancial sector. In the real market, ﬁrm j chooses the
level of output qj ≥ 0. At the time of choosing production, demand is uncer-
tain. Speciﬁcally, the random price corresponding to supplying qj units in
market j is p˜R,j = PR(qj) + ε˜j, where PR(qj) is the expected inverse demand
and ε˜j is a demand shock. The proﬁt of ﬁrm j is π(qj , ε˜j) = (PR(qj)+ ε˜j)qj.
25
The demand shock is assumed to have both systematic and nonsystematic
components. Formally,
Assumption B.1. For all j, k = 1, . . . , NE, j = k, ε˜j = λ˜ + η˜j, where
λ˜ ∼ N(0, σ2λ) and η˜j ∼ N(0, σ2η) such that Eλ˜η˜j = 0 and Eη˜j η˜k = 0.
In the ﬁnancial sector, ﬁrm j issues equity shares. Each share is a claim on
the proﬁt corresponding to the sale of one unit of output by ﬁrm j. Hence,
qj shares of a risky asset are issued by ﬁrm j, and the random payoﬀ of
each share is p˜R,j. Finally, ﬁrm j chooses the fraction 1 − ωj ∈ [0, 1] of the
shares sold in the ﬁnancial market. The variable ωj deﬁnes the ownership
25Assumption 2.1 holds.
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structure of ﬁrm j, which speciﬁes the allocation of the random proﬁt among
the shareholders. Let pF,j be the price of a share of the risky asset issued by
ﬁrm j.
The Shareholders. The group of shareholders is composed of NE ≥ 1
entrepreneurs and NI ≥ 1 investors. Entrepreneur j is the founder of ﬁrm j
and the original claimant of the real proﬁt generated by his entrepreneurial
prospects. Entrepreneur j is also the managing shareholder of ﬁrm j, mak-
ing the output decision, retaining part of the risky asset, and selling the
remaining shares to investors. Investors, on the other hand, do not have
entrepreneurial prospects and have no direct control over the decisions of
the ﬁrms. However, they do have initial wealth, which they use to purchase
shares of the risky assets and the risk-free asset.
The ﬁnal wealth of each of the NI investors is
W˜ ′I = WI +
∑NE
j=1
(
p˜Rj − pFj
)
zj, (24)
where WI is initial wealth and zj is the number of shares for risky asset j
with random per-share return p˜Rj − pFj .26 Given CARA preferences, the
certainty equivalent of an investor is
CEI = WI +
∑NE
j=1
(
PR(qj)− pFj
)
zj − aI
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)∑NE
j=1
z2j /2
− aIσ2λ
∑NE
j=1
∑
k =j
zjzk/2. (25)
The ﬁnal wealth of entrepreneur j is
W˜ ′j = ωj p˜Rjqj + pFj(1− ωj)qj +
∑
k =j
(p˜Rk − pFk) yjk − cq2j/2, (26)
where ωj is entrepreneur j’s level of ownership for ﬁrm j. The term ωj p˜Rjqj
is the portion of real proﬁt from ﬁrm j to which entrepreneur j is entitled.
The term pFj(1 − ωj)qj is the wealth generated from selling claims to real
proﬁt of the remaining (1−ωj)qj units of output at price pFj , and diversifying
among the remaining risky assets (issued by ﬁrms k = j) and the risk-free
26Since investors are identical, there is no index for a particular investor.
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asset. Speciﬁcally, entrepreneur j buys yjk shares of the risky asset issued by
ﬁrm k at unit price pFk with random payoﬀ p˜Rkyjk. Finally, the remaining
pFj (1 − ωj)qj −
∑
k =j pFkyjk is invested in the risk-free asset with a rate of
return normalized to one. Each entrepreneur also faces an unsharable cost
of eﬀort, cq2j /2, c > 0. Given CARA preferences, the certainty equivalent of
investor j is
CEj = ωjPR(qj)qj + pFj(1− ωj)qj +
∑
k =j
(PR(qk)− pFk) yjk
− aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
ω2j q
2
j/2− aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)∑
k =j
y2jk/2
− aEσ2λ
∑
k =j
∑
κ =k
κ =j
yjkyjκ/2− aEσ2λωjqj
∑
k =j
yjk − cq2/2. (27)
We now deﬁne the equilibrium, which is analogous to Deﬁnition 3.1.
As noted, the ﬁnancial sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, i.e.,
both entrepreneurs and investors take the ﬁnancial prices as given. The
equilibrium consists of, for all j, ﬁrm j’s decisions
{
q∗j , ω
∗
j
}
, entrepreneur
j’s demands for risky assets k = j {y∗jk(pFk ,pF−k)}k =j, investors’ demand
for risky asset j, z∗j (pFj ,pF−j), and the ﬁnancial price p
∗
Fj
. Here, pF−j ≡
{pF1 , ..., pFj−1, pFj+1, ..., pFNE}.
Deﬁnition B.2. The tuple
{
q∗j , ω
∗
j ,
{
y∗jk(pFk ,pF−k)
}
k =j , z
∗
j (pFj ,pF−j), p
∗
Fj
}NE
j=1
is an equilibrium if
1. Given
{
q∗k, p
∗
Fk
}NE
k=1
,
{
z∗j (p
∗
Fj
,p∗F−j)
}NE
j=1
= arg max
{zj}NEj=1
{
WI +
∑NE
j=1
(
PR(q
∗
j )− p∗Fj
)
zj
−aI
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)∑NE
j=1
z2j /2− aIσ2λ
∑NE
j=1
∑
k =j
zjzk/2
}
.
(28)
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2. Given {q∗k}k =j and
{
p∗Fj
}NE
j=1
, for all j,
{
q∗j , ω
∗
j ,
{
y∗jk
}
k =j
}
= arg max
qj ,ωj ,{yjk}
k =j
{
ωjPR(qj)qj + p
∗
Fj
(1− ωj)qj
+
∑
k =j
(
PR(q
∗
k)− p∗Fk
)
yjk
− aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
ω2j q
2
j/2− aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)∑
k =j
y2jk/2
−aEσ2λ
∑
k =j
∑
κ =k
κ =j
yjkyjκ/2− aEσ2λωjqj
∑
k =j
yjk − cq2j/2
}
.
(29)
3. Given
{
q∗j , ω
∗
j ,
{
y∗jk(pFk ,pF−k)
}
k =j , z
∗
j (pFj ,pF−j )
}NE
j=1
, p∗Fj clears the ﬁ-
nancial market for risky asset j, j = 1, 2, ..., J .
B.2 Characterization and Discussion
Proposition B.3 states that there exists a unique equilibrium. Proposi-
tions B.4 and B.5 characterize the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition B.3. Suppose c > 0 is high enough so that the Hessian ma-
trix corresponding to any entrepreneur’s maximization problem is negative
deﬁnite. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proposition B.4. In equilibrium, output q∗ satisﬁes
ω∗ (P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)) + (1− ω∗)PR(q∗)
= aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
ω∗2q∗ +
aEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)(1− ω∗)2q∗
+
(NE − 1)σ2λaEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (1− ω∗)ω∗q∗
+ aEσ
2
λω
∗(NE − 1)
(
aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
(1− ω∗)−NIaEσ2λω∗
)
q∗
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) + cq∗
(30)
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and
ω∗ =
aIσ
2
η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+NIaE
((
σ2η + σ
2
λ
) (
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)− (NE − 1) σ4λ)
(31)
Proposition B.5. In equilibrium, the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR (q
∗)− aEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (1− ω∗) q∗
− (NE − 1)σ
2
λaEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)ω∗q∗. (32)
In view of Proposition B.4, expression (30) is analogous to (9) in the sim-
pler model. Indeed, the left-hand side of (30) shows that there is a loss of
market power. Moreover, the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of (30)
shows that the ﬁnancial markets aggregate preferences of the investors. The
following next two terms on the right-hand side of (30) represent the aggre-
gation of preferences of the other entrepreneurs, only present when there is
more than one entrepreneur. Indeed, the ﬁnancial market integrates prefer-
ences across sectors. In other words, entrepreneur j aﬀects the behavior of
entrepreneur k = j in the real sector.
The ﬁnal point we wish to make concerns the relevance of risk with a large
number of shareholders. It is often claimed that a large number of agents
in the ﬁnancial market removes any concern for risk, i.e., the ﬁrms become
risk-neutral. The risk-neutrality remark is a restatement of the Arrow-Lind
Theorem (Arrow and Lind, 1970): if the number of agents sharing risk is
large, behavior toward risk is almost risk-neutral. One must be careful, as
shown in (32), when taking limits. While
lim
NI→∞
p∗F = PR
(
lim
NI→∞
q∗
)
(33)
implies risk-neutrality behavior, the limiting case occurs only if the fraction of
entrepreneurs to investors (or the fraction of entrepreneurship to investment
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activities) goes to zero.27 Moreover, the limiting case of
lim
NE→∞
p∗F = PR
(
lim
NE→∞
q∗
)
− aEσ
4
λ
σ2λ + σ
2
η
lim
NE→∞
q∗ (34)
shows that risk remains relevant even though investors become insigniﬁ-
cant.28 Finally, assuming that neither group of shareholders disappears in
the limit, i.e., limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = c > 0 exists, then (32) does not go to
PR
(
limNE ,NI→∞:NE/NI→c q
∗), implying that risk remains relevant. Moreover,
all results hold in this limiting case.
B.3 Proof
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (28) are
zj : PR(q
∗
j )− p∗Fj = aI
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
zj + aIσ
2
λ
∑NE
k =j
zk, (35)
27Using (30) and (31), it can be shown that limNI→∞ q
∗ exists and limNI→∞ ω
∗ = 0.
28Using (30) and (31), it can be shown that limNE→∞ q∗ exists and limNE→∞ ω∗ = 1.
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j = 1, . . . , NE , so that
29
z∗j
(
p∗Fj ,p
∗
F−j
)
=
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
) (
PR
(
q∗j
)− p∗Fj)− σ2λ∑k =j (PR (q∗k)− p∗Fk)
aIσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) ,
(38)
j = 1, . . . , NE . Therefore, the demand of each investor for risky asset j is
z∗j
(
pFj ,pF−j
)
=
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
) (
PR
(
q∗j
)− pFj)− σ2λ∑k =j (PR (q∗k)− pFk)
aIσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) ,
(39)
j = 1, . . . , NE .
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (29) are
qj : ωj (P
′
R(qj)qj + PR(qj)) + p
∗
Fj
(1− ωj) = aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
ω2j qj + aEσ
2
λωj
∑
k =j
yjk,+cqj
(40)
ωj : PR(qj)qj − p∗Fjqj = aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
ωjq
2
j + aEσ
2
λqj
∑
k =j
yjk, (41)
as well as
yjk : PR (q
∗
k)− p∗Fk = aE
(
σ2λ + σ
2
η
)
yjk + aEσ
2
λ
∑
κ =k
κ =j
yjκ + aEσ
2
λωjqj (42)
29In matrix form,
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
PR(q
∗
1)− p∗F1
PR(q
∗
2)− p∗F2
...
PR(q
∗
NE
)− p∗FNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ = aI
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2λ + σ
2
η σ
2
λ · · · σ2λ
σ2λ σ
2
λ + σ
2
η
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . σ2λ
σ2λ · · · σ2λ σ2λ + σ2η
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
z1
z2
...
zNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (36)
so that
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
z1
z2
...
zNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ −σ2λ · · · −σ2λ
−σ2λ σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . −σ2λ
−σ2λ · · · −σ2λ σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
PR(q
∗
1)− p∗F1
PR(q
∗
2)− p∗F2
...
PR(q
∗
NE
)− p∗FNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
aIσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) .
(37)
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for k = 1, . . . , NE, k = j. Using (42), entrepreneur j’s quantity demanded
for shares of risky asset k = j is30
y∗jk
(
p∗Fj ,p
∗
F−j
)
=
(
σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ
) (
PR (q
∗
k)− p∗Fk
)− σ2λ∑κ =k
κ =j
(
PR (q
∗
κ)− p∗Fκ
)
aEσ2η
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
− σ
2
λωjqj
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
. (45)
30Without loss of generality, consider entrepreneur j = 1’s quantity demanded of risky
asset k = 1. In matrix form,
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
PR (q
∗
2)− p∗F2
PR (q
∗
3)− p∗F3
...
PR
(
q∗NE
)− p∗FNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =aE
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2λ + σ
2
η σ
2
λ · · · σ2λ
σ2λ σ
2
λ + σ
2
η
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . σ2λ
σ2λ · · · σ2λ σ2λ + σ2η
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
y12
y13
...
y1NE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
+ aEσ
2
λ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
ω1q1
ω1q1
...
ω1q1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (43)
so that
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
y12
y13
...
y1NE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ −σ2λ · · · −σ2λ
−σ2λ σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . −σ2λ
−σ2λ · · · −σ2λ σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
PR (q
∗
2)− p∗F2
PR (q
∗
3)− p∗F3
...
PR
(
q∗NE
)− p∗FNE
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
aEσ2η
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
−
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2λ + (NE − 2)σ2η −σ2η · · · −σ2η
−σ2η σ2λ + (NE − 2)σ2η
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . −σ2η
−σ2η · · · −σ2η σ2λ + (NE − 2)σ2η
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
ω1q1
ω1q1
...
ω1q1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
.
(44)
35
Hence, entrepreneur j’s demand for risky asset k = j is
y∗jk
(
pFj ,pF−j
)
=
(
σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ
)
(PR (q
∗
k)− pFk)− σ2λ
∑
κ =k
κ =j
(PR (q
∗
κ)− pFκ)
aEσ2η
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
− σ
2
λωjqj
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
(46)
In order to fully characterize equilibrium output and ownership structure
deﬁned by (40) and (41), we now characterize the equilibrium ﬁnancial prices{
p∗Fj
}NE
j=1
. Financial prices are determined by market-clearing conditions, i.e.,
NIz
∗
j
(
p∗Fj ,p
∗
F−j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investors’ Demand
+
∑
j =k
y∗kj
(
p∗Fj ,p
∗
F−j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demand of entrepreneur k for risky asset j
=
(
1− ω∗j
)
q∗j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply by entrepreneur j
(47)
for j = 1, ..., NE. Using (39) and (46), and considering a symmetric equilib-
rium, (47) is rewritten as
NI
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
(PR (q
∗)− p∗F )− σ2λ (NE − 1) (PR (q∗)− p∗F )
aIσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
+
(NE − 1)
(
σ2η + (NE − 2)σ2λ
)
(PR(q
∗)− p∗F )− σ2λ (NE − 1) (NE − 2) (PR (q∗)− p∗F )
aEσ2η
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
− (NE − 1)σ
2
λω
∗q∗
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
= (1− ω∗) q∗. (48)
Solving the above expression for p∗F yields
p∗F = PR (q
∗)− aEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) (1− ω∗) q∗
− (NE − 1)σ
2
λaEaI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)ω∗q∗, (49)
as in (32).
Having characterized the equilibrium ﬁnancial prices, we now turn to the
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behavior of the ﬁrms. To that end, plugging (32) into (46) yields
y∗ (p∗F ) =
PR (q
∗)− p∗F
aE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
) − σ2λω∗q∗
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
, (50)
=
(
aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
)
(1− ω∗)−NIaEσ2λω∗
)
q∗
NIaE
(
σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λ
)
+ (NE − 1) aI
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) , (51)
in a symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, plugging (32) and (51) into (40) yields (30) for the equilibrium
level of output. Plugging (32) and (51) into (41), and simplifying yields (31)
for the equilibrium entrepreneur’s level of ownership.
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